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I. Introduction
In rapidly growing developing countries, the transfer of land rights from those
who move to nonfarm sectors, or migrating households, to those who continue
farming, or remaining farm households, is critically important for successful
industrialization and the structural transformation of the agriculture sector
(Otsuka, Estudillo, and Sawada 2009). If land markets are inefficient, mi-
grating households cannot liquidate their land assets and the remaining farm
households cannot expand their farm size to earn an income comparable to
that which could be earned in the off-farm sector. In postwar Japan, a poorly
functioning land rental market due to rent controls and other government
interventions was one of the major reasons for the persistence of a large cohort
of small-scale, inefficient, part-time farmers (Hayami 1988; Otsuka 1992).
Thus, the development of well-functioning land markets should be one of the
important policy goals that, in addition to other things, can mitigate inter-
sectoral income disparity, especially in the case of emerging middle-income
countries (World Bank 2007).
At the same time it is also known that, if at least one of the three factor
markets (i.e. the markets for labor, land sales, or land rental) functions com-
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petitively under the assumption of constant returns to scale, an efficient al-
location of resources can be achieved (Kevane 1996). However, due to the
high cost of monitoring farm work, farm labor markets are almost always
thin, confining the use of hired labor to simple tasks (Hayami and Otsuka
1993). As a consequence, care-intensive activities, such as water management
and fertilizer application, are nearly exclusively carried out by family labor.
Likewise, land sales markets are not expected to function competitively as a
means to facilitate land reallocation across households because of chronic im-
perfections in credit markets. Moreover, because land can be used not only
for farming but also as collateral enabling access to formal credit markets, the
market price of land is often higher than the present value of future agricultural
profits that accrue to land, making it difficult to finance the cost of land
purchase (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). Thus, among labor, land sales,
and land rental markets, the land rental market may be the most feasible
institution through which resources can be efficiently reallocated across farm
households in rural villages (Otsuka 2007; Holden, Otsuka, and Place 2009).
Although the literature on tenancy markets argues that high transaction
costs due to the high cost of monitoring the work effort of tenants is the
major source of tenancy market failure (Skoufias 1995), the risk of losing the
rights of rented-out land can also be potentially a major constraint on the
land rental transactions in many areas where individual land rights are not
well established (Otsuka and Place 2001). China is no exception. In this
country, individual land rights have been weak, and land is frequently re-
allocated among households in order to adjust changing population structures
arising from the out-migration and other demographic shifts involving house-
hold members (Benjamin and Brandt 2002). Indeed, land might be expro-
priated if land is rented out because renting out can be regarded as the sign
of a weak demand for land (Brandt et al. 2002).
In order to examine whether the risk of land expropriation is a major
constraint on land rental transactions in China, this study constructs a two-
period model of the determinants of land rental transactions that explicitly
incorporates the risk of land expropriation. Using the model to specify the
relationship between the risk of expropriation and land rental, we test this
hypothesis by using household survey data that were collected by one of our
team members.
In China rapid industrialization has increased the income of the urban
nonfarm population, and as a result the income disparity between farmers and
nonfarmers has increased significantly (e.g., Rozelle, Huang, and Ostuka 2005).
In order to increase farm income in the face of increasing labor costs, the
expansion of farm size (along with large-scale mechanization) is necessary
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(Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Given China’s limited land endowment, it is also
important to enhance the efficiency of land allocations among households so
as to allow the nation’s agricultural sector to keep up with the nation’s growing
food demand. Several researchers, however, point out that, despite more than
decades of market reform, land markets in China still remain underdeveloped
(e.g., Lin 1988; Bowlus and Sicular 2003). In order to reduce the income
disparity between the farm and nonfarm populations and to raise the efficiency
of farm sectors, promoting well-functioning tenancy markets is an important
item on the policy agenda.
To accomplish our objectives, this article is organized as follows. Section II
presents a two-period, theoretical model of the determinants of land rental
transactions and proposes three testable hypotheses. The data set is described
and descriptive statistics are provided in Section III. The results of our re-
gression analysis are reported in Section IV. Section V concludes and provides
a discussion of the article’s policy implications.
II. Conceptual Framework of Land Rental Transactions
Consider a farm household consuming a composite good and enjoying leisure.
The household is endowed with units of land and units of time and can¯ ¯A L
produce the agricultural product on its farm according to the concave pro-
duction function F(A, L), where A is the area of farm land cultivated by the
household and L is the amount of labor used on the farm. A major feature
of the model is that if the household rents out the whole or a part of its land
(i.e., A ! ), the local government (or in the case of China, the local quasi-A¯
government unit, the village) may expropriate the area of farm rented out
(i.e.,  A) at the end of the period, so that the household’s land endowmentA¯
in the next period becomes A. The expropriated land will not be kept by the
renter but will be reallocated by the local government.1 For simplicity, we
will focus on a two-period case below, but the outcome remains essentially
unchanged if the model has more than two periods.
We assume that the household maximizes the expected utility over the two
periods, which is given by
Up u(c , l ) E[bu(c , l )], (1)1 1 2 2
subject to
1 The decision to reallocate expropriated land is usually made by the local village leader who acts
with some discretion. In the literature, it has been argued that leaders tend to favor their own and
related families or families with a small area of land compared with the size of family labor (Brandt
et al. 2002). In our observation, the probability that the renter receives the land is nil.
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¯¯c p F(A , L )  w(L L  l )  R (A A ),t t t t t t t t
tp 1, 2, (2)
L¯ L  l ≥ 0, tp 1, 2, (3)t t
N N O O¯ ¯R p d (A , A )(r g ) d (A , A )(r g ),t t t t t
tp 1, 2, (4)
A with probability p o1¯ ¯A p if d (A , A )p 1, (5)2 1 1¯{A with probability 1 p1
o¯ ¯ ¯A p A if d (A , A )p 0. (6)2 1 1 1
Here u(c, l) is the utility function, c is consumption, l is leisure, and b is a
discount factor. The household is assumed to have no access to the credit
market. Thus, the consumption in a period is equal to the income in the same
period, as equation (2) indicates. While the price of the composite good is
normalized to unity, the off-farm wage rate is denoted by w and the effective
rent received or paid by the household is denoted by R.2 Inequality (3) rep-
resents the constraint that the time spent by the household working for an
off-farm wage, that is, is nonnegative. It is also assumed that theL¯ L l,
household cannot hire labor for cultivating its own farm because of the pro-
hibitively high cost of hired labor.3
In equation (4), it is assumed that there are proportional transaction costs.
Such transaction costs have been considered in the literature on farmer par-
ticipation in food and labor markets (e.g., de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet
1991; Goetz 1992; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000). The idea of propor-
tional transaction costs may apply to land rental markets, particularly in China,
2 Although we do not analyze the migration decision explicitly, it can be easily incorporated into
the model by specifying the migration cost. Such an expanded model allows farm household
members to be engaged in off-farm jobs through rural-urban migration.
3 Care-intensive tasks in agricultural production, such as water control and fertilizer application,
are rarely performed by hired labor because of the difficulty of monitoring such tasks for the
employer. In general, the term of the hired agricultural labor is expected to be short (a few days),
and the tasks are simple and observable, such as transplanting and weeding (Hayami and Otsuka
1993). Thus, this study excludes this casual labor market from the formal analysis. Although the
data show that around 10% of the sample households hired outside labor, the proportion of hired
labor in the household’s total labor input is only 2.1% on average, and such hiring is limited to
the peak season.
This content downloaded from 210.137.153.113 on January 12, 2016 20:44:56 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Kimura et al. 489
where landholding per farm household is so tiny that the number of land
transactions tends to increase with an increase in transacted land areas. That
is, search and negotiation costs associated with land rental transactions are
expected to increase with the area of land to be rented in or out. Let gN denote
the per-unit transaction cost associated with renting in and gO that associated
with renting out. Thus, r  gN is the rent effectively paid by the household
when it rents in land, and r  gO is the rent effectively received by the
household when it rents out land. The land renting behavior of the household
can be characterized by two indicator functions: , which is equal toN ¯d (A, A)
one if (renting in) and zero otherwise, and , which is equalO¯ ¯A 1 A d (A, A)
to one if (renting out) and zero otherwise. Equations (5) and (6) represent¯A ! A
the following: renting out causes land expropriation by the local government
with probability p; if expropriation occurs, the household in the second period
will be endowed with the area cultivated by the household itself in the first
period, that is, A1; if the household did not rent out in the first period, it
will be endowed with in the second period with certainty. In the secondA¯1
period, there is no longer an expropriation risk even if the farm is rented out.4
The maximization problem can be solved by using backward induction,
starting with the second-period choice of c2, A2, L2, and l2 and taking asA¯2
given, whether it is equal to or A1 (! ). The maximized utility level in¯ ¯A A1 1
the second period is given by
¯ ¯¯V(A )p max u[F(A , L ) w(L L  l ) R (A A ), l ]2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
¯subject to L L  l ≥ 0, (7)2 2
where R2 is given by equation (4). The first-order conditions are
NF(A , L ) p r g ,1 2 2
N¯ ¯A 1 A if F(A , L ) 1 r g , (8)2 2 1 2 2
N o¯ ¯A p A if r g ≥ F(A , L ) ≥ r g , (9)2 2 1 2 2
o o¯ ¯F(A , L )p r g and A ! A if r g 1 F(A , L ), (10)1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
F (A , L ) p u (c , l )/u (c , l ), (11)2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
4 This assumption is not unrealistic if we consider that one period in our model corresponds to a decade
or so, as the Chinese government has strengthened the individual use rights of land over time.
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Figure 1. Land rental market participation
¯F (A , L ) w ≥ 0 and L L  l ≥ 02 2 2 2 2
with complementary slackness, (12)
where Fi and ui, ip 1, 2, are the partial derivatives of the production and utility
functions with respect to their ith variable and c2 and R2 are given by equations
(2) and (4), respectively. Equations (8), (9), and (10) imply that the household
rents in or out land or stays away from land rental transactions, depending on
whether the marginal product of land evaluated at is higher than r  gN orA¯2
lower than r gO or between them. As equations (11) and (12) show, the optimal
time allocation requires the equality between the marginal product of farm labor
input and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption,
which are equal to w if the household supplies labor to the off-farm sector but
higher than w if the labor endowment of the household is sufficiently small so
that the household spends no time working for the off-farm wage.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between land rental market participation
behavior and the endowments of land and labor.5 For the moment, the hor-
5 In this figure, the boundary curves are graphed under the following assumptions: the production
function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, F(A, L)p A0.4L0.4; the utility function is also of the Cobb-Douglas
type, u(c, l)p 2lnc  ln l; the discount factor and the probability of expropriation are bp 0.8 and p
p 0.25, respectively; the wage rate and the market rent are w p 0.4 and r p 0.5, respectively; and
the proportional transaction costs are gN p gO p 0.1. Although not drawn in the figure, if there are
no proportional transaction costs, there is only one boundary curve, which is vertical at p 0.648.A¯1
We assume that the production function is subject to decreasing returns to scale because of the absence
of large-scale mechanization and the dominance of scattered landholdings in China.
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izontal axis in the figure measures , even though it will measure as well¯ ¯A A2 1
when we analyze the situation in the first period below. The first quadrant of
the plane is divided by two boundary curves, B1 and B2, into three¯ ¯(A , L)2
segments, S1, S2, and S3  S4. The household chooses renting in if endowment
falls within S1, no rental market participation in the case of S2, and¯ ¯(A , L)2
renting out in the case of S3  S4. The boundary curves are upward sloping
for small labor endowments and vertical for large labor endowments.6 Below
the upward-sloping part of B2, the household’s work time is fully devoted to
farming and still it is not enough to cultivate the whole area of , so thatA¯2
the household rents out a part of .A¯2
It should be clear that the maximized utility V in period 2 is an increasing
function of , which is equal to either A1 or . By the envelope theorem,¯ ¯A A2 1
the derivative of V is
′ ¯V (A )p u (c , l )R . (13)2 1 2 2 2
With the V function, the whole maximization problem is written as
O O¯ ¯ ¯ ¯( )max u(c , l ) d (A , A )b[ pV(A ) (1 p)V(A )] 1 d (A , A ) bV(A ) (14){ }1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
subject to
¯¯c p F(A , L )  w(L L  l )  R (A A ), (15)1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L¯ L  l ≥ 0. (16)1 1
If the household did not rent out its farm land in the first period (i.e.,
p 0), the problem is to maximize subject toO ¯ ¯d (A , A ) u(c , l ) bV(A )1 1 1 1 1
constraints (15) and (16). Since the second-period utility does not depend on
the decision made in the first period, the problem in this case is equivalent
to the static optimization problem (7).
If (part of) the farm is rented out in the first period ( p 1), theO ¯d (A , A )1 1
size of farm cultivated by the household is given by the first-order condition
O ′u (c , l )[F(A , L )  (r g )] bpV (A )p 0, (17)1 1 1 1 1 1 1
where the second term is the expected future marginal gain. Using (13) and
noting that R2 p r  g
O in this case, we have
6 There is a unique pair (A*, L*) that satisfies F1(A*, L*) p r  g
N and F2(A*, L*)p w. There
is also a unique value of l* that satisfies u2(F(A*, L*), l*) / u1(F(A*, L*), l*) p w. Boundary B1
has a kink at point (A*, L*  l*). For labor endowment greater than L*  l*, the boundary on
which land endowment is equal to A* is vertical at A*. Similarly, boundary B2 has a kink at point
(A**, L**  l**) at which F1(A**, L**) p r  g
O, F2(A**, L**) p w, and u2(F(A**, L**),
l**) / u1(F(A**, L**), l**) p w.
This content downloaded from 210.137.153.113 on January 12, 2016 20:44:56 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
492 economic development and cultural change
′ Oˆ
ˆV (A )p u (c , l )(r g ), (18)1 1 2 2
where on the right-hand side is the marginal utility of consumptionˆˆu (c , l )1 2 2
in the second period in the case of expropriation. Substituting and rearranging,
we obtain
ˆ
ˆu (c , l )1 2 2OF(A , L ) p (r g ) 1 bp . (19)1 1 1 [ ]u (c , l )1 1 1
That is, the marginal product of land, F1, is not equated with the effective
rent r  gO that the household receives but with a fraction of r  gO because
of the expropriation risk. This fraction is smaller if the discount factor is larger,
the probability of expropriation is higher, and the marginal rate of substitution
between the current consumption and the future consumption after expro-
priation is higher. Because the marginal product of land is decreasing, equation
(19) indicates that the expropriation risk reduces the area rented out.
Figure 1 illustrates how the expropriation risk discourages households from
renting out their lands. While the boundary between renting out and no
participation in the land rental market is B2 in the absence of the risk, it is
B3 in the presence of the risk, indicating that the risk discourages the house-
holds whose ( , ) falls within segment S3 from renting out completely and¯ ¯A L1
reduces the areas rented out by the households whose ( , ) falls within¯ ¯A L1
segment S4.
Based on the outcomes of the model, we advance the following testable
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The perception of tenure insecurity reduces the likelihood
of renting out land and the area of farm rented out.
Given land endowment and the expropriation risk, the incentive to rent
out land depends on the size of the labor resource and its education level. As
the education level of a worker increases, his or her off-farm wage rate rises.
A higher wage rate makes off-farm activities more attractive and increases the
incentive to rent out land. In figure 1, an increase in the wage rate shifts the
vertical parts of boundaries B1 and B2 to the left and extends them downward
until they reach the upward-sloping parts, whose locations are not affected by
the increase in the wage rate.7 The steeper (but not vertical) part of boundary
B3 also moves to the left when the wage rate increases. As long as the off-
farm wage rate is positively associated with the education level, households
7 The upward-sloping parts of the boundaries are not affected by the increase in the wage rate
because the household with such a small labor resource is not supplying labor to the off-farm
sector.
This content downloaded from 210.137.153.113 on January 12, 2016 20:44:56 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Kimura et al. 493
with highly educated members will have a stronger incentive to rent out land
for a given land endowment and a given number of family workers. Thus, it
seems reasonable to hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The likelihood of renting out land and the area of farm
rented out tend to increase as the number of family workers decreases and
their education level increases, whereas the opposite applies to the likelihood
of renting in and the area rented in.
III. Data and Descriptive Analysis
Our empirical analysis uses household data collected in 2000 by a team of
researchers from the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) in Beijing,
the University of Toronto, and the University of California, Davis. The data
set covers 60 randomly selected villages that were chosen from the list of all
the villages in six representative provinces: Hebei, Liaoning, Shanxi, Zhejiang,
Hubei, and Sichuan. In each village, 20 sample households were randomly
selected.8 The sample as a whole consists of 1,200 households. The data set
contains rich information on land rental transactions, land endowment and
labor endowment at the farm household level, and the frequency of land
reallocations in the past at the community level, which is related to tenure
insecurity. Also asked was whether the farmer perceived the risk of future land
reallocation by village leaders. Specifically, respondents were asked whether
they had certain expectations about not having their land subject to reallo-
cations in the coming 30 years (for a reason that will be described below).9
A. Human Resources
Table 1 describes a set of variables that can be used to measure a household’s
land, labor, and other resources. On average, a household has 3.6 adult mem-
bers. Those older than age 65 account for around 7% of adult members, and
those younger than age 34 account for 45%. More than half of the adult
members completed primary education, and more than 30% of the adult
members completed secondary education. Note, however, that the sample
provinces differ in school attainment. While 67% of adults completed primary
education and 46% completed secondary education in Shanxi, the percentages
are only 44% and 23%, respectively, in Hubei, where the average school
attainment is the lowest in our sample.
8 The households were randomly chosen from a comprehensive list compiled by the village ac-
countant. The list included all households—both those that were farming and those that were not,
although the latter were very few. The sample was not stratified.
9 The reason why the 30-year period does matter is explained later in this section.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTION OF HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES
All Hebei Liaoning Shanxi Zhejiang Hubei Sichuan
No. adults 3.64 3.79 3.63 3.51 3.90 3.62 3.60
(1.57) (1.48) (1.70) (1.41) (1.63) (1.54) (1.61)
No. males of ages:
20–34 .78 .75 .82 .71 .82 .75 .84
(.81) (.76) (.82) (.76) (.91) (.81) (.81)
35–49 .61 .62 .59 .61 .65 .56 .62
(.62) (.61) (.60) (.61) (.68) (.58) (.64)
50–64 .30 .28 .31 .33 .34 .28 .26
(.47) (.45) (.46) (.49) (.50) (.46) (.44)
65 or older .15 .14 .12 .14 .14 .23 .13
(.38) (.34) (.32) (.41) (.37) (.43) (.36)
No. females of ages:
20–34 .85 .85 .87 .72 .95 .83 .88
(.94) (.98) (1.04) (.88) (1.04) (.76) (.91)
35–49 .62 .69 .57 .65 .69 .55 .55
(.58) (.64) (.58) (.53) (.54) (.60) (.55)
50–64 .23 .26 .25 .25 .21 .22 .22
(.43) (.44) (.44) (.43) (.42) (.41) (.42)
65 or older .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .1
(.35) (.41) (.29) (.34) (.31) (.38) (.35)
Proportion of adults who
completed primary educa-
tion .53 .46 .54 .67 .51 .44 .55
(.38) (.38) (.39) (.35) (.36) (.37) (.37)
Proportion of adults who
completed secondary edu-
cation .31 .24 .31 .46 .30 .23 .30
(.34) (.31) (.33) (.37) (.33) (.32) (.33)
Value of agricultural produc-
tion asset (yuan) 417.4 823.7 404.3 478.3 185.2 281.3 364.2
(651.9) (1,061.9) (618.4) (653.6) (424.4) (316.7) (398.9)
Proportion of adults engaged
in off-farm employment .60 .59 .58 .50 .73 .56 .64
(.43) (.45) (.42) (.40) (.42) (.43) (.42)
Daily farm earning per family
worker (yuan) 7.9 8.1 4.9 13.7 1.3 6.2 4.4
(16.8) (11.0) (6.7) (31.9) (19.2) (8.5) (5.0)
Daily off-farm wage (yuan) 27.3 26.3 21.2 29.6 31.6 21.0 34.0
(11.5) (13.5) (6.05) (9.7) (7.6) (4.0) (16.3)
Note. Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
B. Off-Farm Employment
Although more than 80% of the adults were engaged in some type of farm
work, either full time or part time, the nonfarm labor market only emerged
in China in the past 2 decades, It offers relatively lucrative employment op-
portunities outside family farming (de Brauw et al. 2002).10 Indeed, 60% of
adults reported some form of off-farm employment; a quarter of them migrated
10 Our data show that off-farm employment provides 3.5 times higher daily earnings than farm
labor employment on average.
This content downloaded from 210.137.153.113 on January 12, 2016 20:44:56 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Kimura et al. 495
to locations beyond the immediate vicinity of the village to obtain off-farm
jobs.11 Among our sample provinces, Zhejiang province has by far the highest
rate of participation in the off-farm labor market (73%), and this is followed
by Sichuan province (64%). Although Shanxi province has the lowest off-farm
employment rate, half of the adults still worked off the farm.
C. Land Reallocations
In the early 1980s, when the Household Responsibility System (HRS) was
being promoted, almost all farmers were given land use rights, which were
good for 15 years.12 The de facto ownership of the land, however, belonged
to the local village, and village leaders could reallocate land to control the
behavior of farmers (e.g., Rozelle and Boisvert 1995). In the late 1990s, as
the first 15-year land contract was coming to an end, China’s top leadership
made two directives regarding the management of cultivated land. First, local
governments were encouraged to organize village leaders and help them re-
allocate land among households in each village to redress imbalances in access
to cultivated land that had arisen from the previous 15 years due to demo-
graphic and other factors. Village-wide reallocations were supposed to set the
stage for the next part of the directive: extension of the land contract period
for 30 years, during which time landholdings were supposed to be fixed. It
is important to note that in the late 1990s these national policy directives
were not law-based regulations—as was the Rural Land Contracting Law, which
was passed by the National Peoples Congress in 2003 (a time after the survey
collected data for this study)—they were only policy pronouncements.
Therefore, while this was a national directive, the reality for cultivated land
management in China was that local governments retained a lot of control
over the land and would often insulate villages from national policy directives
(Brandt 2002; Schwarzwalder et al. 2002). Due to this policy space created
by the decentralized nature of central-local relations during the 1990s, local
governments took actions in two broad forms. In some cases, they followed
the national policy closely, directing villages to reallocate cultivated land among
all households and then issue 30-year land contracts based on the new dis-
11 In this study, an adult member is considered to have migrated if he or she worked (and lived)
away from home for more than 6 months in the sample year.
12 Due to the failure to promote agricultural production through a collective farming system (in
which a group of farmers formed a production team and shared the residual profits depending on
the work points that they earned (Lin 1992) during the socialist period in China (1949–78), the
Chinese government made a monumental decision in 1978 (Lardy 1983). Between 1978 and 1983,
officials decollectivized production teams (subunits of today’s villages) and granted land use rights
and residual income rights to individual farmers. This system was called the Household Respon-
sibility System, and it was almost ubiquitously adopted.
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tributions. In other cases, however, local governments chose to allow their
villages to continue to operate in a business-as-usual environment, a system
that is described by Brandt (2002).
In the business-as-usual environment, villages were allowed to make ad-
justments when they believed it was appropriate to do so. In such villages,
many different methods of land management were allowed—in some villages,
land reallocations were made on a case-by-case basis (i.e., if one family lost a
member—to say marriage out of the village of a daughter—and another family
gained a member—to say a new birth of a granddaughter), an idiosyncratic
adjustment could be made by village leaders (i.e., by transferring a piece of
land from the family whose daughter married out to the family that had just
gained a granddaughter); in other villages, the right to adjust was given to
the small group (a subvillage administrative unit), and while leaders of some
small groups adjusted their land allocations, others did not. Kung, Lin, and
Shen (2004) find that administrative land reallocations arose from more than
simple demographic factors. Brandt, Rozelle, and Turner (2004) demonstrate
that while over time household size has become less important as a determinant
of land reallocations, economic efficiency (for reasons such as the effect of land
reallocations on off-farm labor income) has become a more important concern
of village leaders. Regardless of the exact approach to land management that
villages adopted in the business-as-usual regions of the country, the result of
such a system was that land reallocations were much less systematic and more
opaque. Li, Rozelle, and Brandt (1998), Brandt et al. (2002), Jacoby, Li, and
Rozzelle (2002), and Deininger and Jin (2003) argue that such land reallo-
cations have created a perception of land tenure insecurity for farm households.
Deininger et al. (2004) find that only 12% of farmers expected no reallocations
in the future and that many farmers were uncertain about future reallocations
in their villages.
In our sample, 99.8% of households have land use rights. The average farm
size of sample households is small—only 7.7 mu, as shown in table 2.13 While
the typical household in Hebei and Shanxi provinces cultivates 12.9 mu and
11.8 mu, respectively, the average sample household in Hubei and Zhejiang
provinces only cultivates between 4.1 mu and 4.4 mu, respectively. Since the
introduction of the HRS, 75% of households have experienced land reallo-
cations. In Hebei, Shanxi, and Zhejiang provinces, more than 90% of house-
holds experienced land reallocations. The percentage of households experienc-
ing land reallocation, however, is less than 50% in Hubei and Sichuan
provinces. The “proportion of households that perceive tenure insecurity,”
13 One mu is equivalent to 0.067 ha.
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TABLE 2
LAND ENDOWMENT, REALLOCATIONS, AND RENTAL TRANSACTIONS BY PROVINCE
All Hebei Liaoning Shanxi Zhejiang Hubei Sichuan
Land endowment (mu) 7.7 12.9 7.7 11.8 4.4 4.1 5.6
(9.47) (14.59) (5.27) (10.86) (4.30) (3.02) (9.13)
Proportion of households that
experienced reallocations .75 .94 .83 .93 .93 .41 .49
(.32) (.09) (.31) (.12) (.19) (.26) (.33)
Proportion of households that
perceive tenure insecurity .90 .99 .99 .81 .61 .99 .99
(.30) (.10) (.07) (.39) (.49) (.001) (.12)
Proportion of households that
rent in land .19 .19 .12 .24 .39 .07 .11
(.39) (.39) (.33) (.43) (.49) (.25) (.32)
Proportion of households that
rent out land .12 .11 .07 .13 .24 .09 .08
(.33) (.31) (.25) (.33) (.43) (.29) (.28)
Area of land rented in (mu) .6 1.0 .2 1.2 .8 .1 .2
(2.33) (3.70) (.73) (3.55) (1.87) (.66) (.97)
Area of land rented out (mu) .3 .5 .1 .4 .4 .1 .2
(1.31) (2.05) (.53) (1.99) (.84) (.58) (.82)
Proportion of land rented .05 .05 .02 .07 .13 .01 .04
(.15) (.12) (.10) (.17) (.22) (.06) (.15)
Note. Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
shown in the third row of table 2, is the across-village average of the proportion
of households that are not sure that the local government will fix the allocation
of land in the village until the end of the 30-year contract. When considering
the entire sample, on average, 90% of households in the sample were uncertain
as to the whether or not reallocations would occur in the coming 30 years;
10% were sure that the next land reallocation would be implemented only
after the 30-year contract period had elapsed.14 In Hebei, Liaonin, Hubei, and
Sichuan, tenure insecurity was perceived by almost all households. By contrast,
households in Zhejiang and Shanxi were much more confident of their tenure
security; tenure insecurity was perceived only by 61% of households in Zhe-
jiang and 81% in Shanxi.
D. Land Rental Transactions
Sharecropping is rarely observed in China. Although tenancy transactions were
not illegal under the Household Responsibility System, the land rental market
was almost nonexistent throughout the 1980s (Brandt 2002). In the 1990s,
however, land rental transactions increased as off-farm labor markets began to
emerge in rural China because off-farm job opportunities created incentives
for farmers to rent out their land (Kung 1995; Deininger and Jin 2005).
14 Consistent with this, Schwarzwalder et al. (2002) find that, in 1999, 12.7% of households
expected no more reallocations during the 30-year land use term.
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TABLE 3
LAND ENDOWMENT PER ADULT FAMILY MEMBER RENTAL TRANSACTIONS, 2000
Percentage of Households
Average Area of Land
(Mu)
Land Endowment
per Adult Renting In No participation Renting Out Rented In Rented Out
0–20th percentile 19.4 73.1 8.3 1.05 .34
20th–40th percentile 18.8 71.4 11.1 .48 .28
40th–60th percentile 16.5 71.6 12.8 .64 .24
60th–80th percentile 15.4 75.9 9.5 .57 .28
Top 20% group 23.7 62.7 18.6 .60 .36
Although the incidence of land rental transactions across households in sample
villages is still low, as Rozelle et al. (2005) attest, it has been increasing.
Brandt et al. (2002) find that less than 1% of the land across China was rented
in and only 2% of households rented in or out their land in 1988. In our
data, 19% of households rented in and 12% rented out their land; the rented
land accounted for 5% of the land cultivated, as is shown in table 2.15 Among
the sample provinces, land rental markets are the most active in Zhejiang and
the least active in Hubei.
Table 3 relates land rental transactions to the distribution of land endowment
per adult family member within villages. Households in each sample village
are classified into five groups of equal sample size according to their land
endowment per adult. In the group with the smallest land endowment per
adult in the villages, 19.4% of the households, on average (over all the sample
villages), rented in their land, 73.1% neither rented in nor rented out, and
8.3% rented out their land in 2000. The percentage of households that rented
in was smaller for groups with larger land endowment per adult except for
the top 20% group. The percentage of households that rented out their land
tended to increase with land endowment per adult. These observations are
consistent with hypothesis 2. From table 3 as a whole, however, it is not clear
how tenancy outcomes and land endowment are related.
IV. Regression Analysis
In this section, we explore the determinants of tenancy market participation
by means of reduced-form regressions. The estimates of the functions explaining
15 In our study, land rental includes all tenancy transactions. In China, most rental transactions
are carried out with the leaseholder providing some type of consideration to the renter prior to
the start of the contract. In some cases, the consideration is paid in cash. In-kind payments are
also used (although it is still a fixed rent paid prior to the cropping year). In some cases, where
the land rent is low, there is no rent charged, but the leaseholder typically has to pay the land
taxes and fees. In some cases, the renter pays the taxes and fees; in other cases, they are paid by
the leaseholder.
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renting in and renting out are reported in tables 4 and 5, respectively. On
the right-hand side of the regression equations are variables representing house-
hold characteristics, village characteristics, and provincial-level fixed effects.
In another specification, village characteristics and provincial-level fixed effects
are superseded by village-level fixed effects. Toward the end of this section,
we will use the same set of right-hand-side variables to estimate a linear
probability model for the perceived tenure insecurity.
To measure the labor endowment of a household, we use the number of
adult household members. Note that this variable includes those who have
migrated, and hence it can be regarded as exogenous. Among the village
characteristics included in regressions is the standard deviation of land en-
dowment per adult household member. This variable is intended to capture
the inequality of land distribution in the village, but it may fail to serve this
purpose fully. Thus, we ran supplementary regressions that include the standard
deviation of land endowment itself, the ratio of the 80th percentile to the
20th percentile of land endowment, and a similar ratio of land endowment
per adult. We also controlled for the effects of the location of the household
in the distribution of land in the village by inserting the ranking of the
household in the land distribution. It turned out, however, that these additional
controls had significant effects or affected the estimates of the effects of the
other variables only in a few exceptional cases, so the results for these are not
shown in this article.
In the first three columns of table 4, the dependent variable is the area
rented in. In the last three columns, it is the dummy variable indicating
whether or not the household rents in land, regardless of the area rented in.
Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 include provincial-level fixed effects, whereas columns
3 and 6 include village-level fixed effects. The estimator used in the first three
columns is ordinary least squares; this could be replaced by the tobit estimator
without changing the qualitative results. The next three columns are specified
as the linear probability model; these results remain qualitatively unchanged
when the Probit model is applied.
In columns 1–3, the number of adult males younger than age 65 and that
of females younger than age 50 have positive effects on the area rented in.
The effect of aged family members, who work less than young members, is
negative even though it is insignificant. These results are consistent with
hypothesis 2 that the households with abundant labor endowment relative to
land endowment tend to rent in land. The proportion of highly educated adults
has negative and significant effects in columns 4–6, which is also consistent
with hypothesis 2. In columns 4–6, however, the number of male adults and
the number of young female adults have negative coefficients in the linear
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probability model. These results suggest that something other than the eco-
nomic force highlighted by hypothesis 2 is also at work. Probably one factor
is the tendency that a larger area of land was allocated to households with a
larger number of household members. Another factor is the migration of males
in their prime and young female adults over an extended period. Increases in
the number of such adults may lead to larger land endowment and smaller
labor supply to farming, thereby decreasing the probability with which the
household rents in land.
Two variables are used to capture land reallocation experiences. One is a
dummy variable that is equal to unity if the household was involved in land
reallocation. The other is the proportion of households that experienced land
reallocations in the village. According to table 4, neither variable has a sig-
nificant effect on renting in. The average off-farm wage rate has a positive and
significant effect on renting in. A higher off-farm wage rate is expected to
induce households to reallocate labor time away from farming to off-farm
activities, which would result in an increase in renting out and a decrease in
renting in with other things being unchanged. To the extent that the land
rental market is closed within the village, however, renting out and renting
in cannot change in opposite directions, and we do not have a priori prediction
about the direction of their changes. We will return to this point later. The
village average of land endowment per adult family member has positive and
significant effects on the area rented in. This may be because in villages where
average land endowment per adult is large, those who would like to rent in
land will not have to search for and negotiate with a large number of potential
transaction partners. The standard deviation of the land distribution has no
significant effect on the area rented in, but it has a negative and significant
effect on the likelihood of renting in. The latter effect, however, is insignificant
if we use alternative measures of the land inequality, such as the standard
deviation of land endowment and the ratio of the 80th percentile to the 20th
percentile of the land endowment, as well as the similar ratio of land endow-
ment per adult.16
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the renting-out equations. The
specification of the renting-out equations is the same as the renting-in equations
in table 4. Among the adult members of a household, females in their late
thirties to mid-sixties are the most unlikely to migrate to remote areas to
work. The negative effects of the number of such females on the area rented
out and the probability of renting out are consistent with hypothesis 2 that
16 The other parts of table 4, as well as tables 5 and 6, remain unchanged when these alternative
measures of land inequality are included in regression.
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the households with abundant land endowment relative to family labor tend
to rent out land. The positive and significant effects of the proportion of highly
educated adults are also consistent with this hypothesis.
The village-level experience of land reallocations has positive and significant
effects on the area rented out in column 1 and the likelihood of renting out
in column 4. The household-level experience has a significant effect on the
likelihood of renting out when provincial-level fixed effects are imposed, as
shown in column 5, but not when village-level fixed effects are imposed, as
shown in column 6. The effect of the off-farm wage rate on renting out is
positive and highly significant. Since its effect on renting in is also positive
and significant, as shown in table 4, we may say that a village with a high
average off-farm wage rate tends to have more active land rental transactions.
The village average of household land endowment per adult has a positive and
marginally significant effect on the area rented out. This result is consistent
with our previous argument that land rental transaction costs are lower in
villages where farm sizes are larger.
In the past, local governments in some regions in the sample followed
national policy closely and implemented major land reallocation systematically.
In other regions, however, local governments chose to allow their villages to
continue to operate in a business-as-usual environment, and as a result, land
reallocations were idiosyncratic and difficult to predict. While it is difficult
to prove empirically, we believe that it is plausible that such a system may
have had the following outcomes. In regions in which major land reallocations
had been implemented systematically, there was reason for many of the house-
holds to believe that since their leaders were following national policy, there
would not be any more reallocations until the end of the 30-year contract
period. The opposite was true in the business-as-usual regions, where, by the
nature of China’s traditional (pre-policy) cultivated land management system,
villagers had a less firm basis on which to form expectations about tenure
security. Our expectation is that households should have more secure expec-
tations about not having their land subject to reallocations for the coming 30
years (i.e., they should have more secure tenure) in villages where large shares
of households experienced land reallocations than in villages where fewer house-
holds were involved in land reallocations. To represent the tenure insecurity
perception, we use a dummy variable that is equal to zero if the household is
sure that its land will not be reallocated before the end of the 30-year contract
period and one if the household is unsure. Its average value in each sample
province is shown in table 2.
The estimated linear probability model that explains the tenure insecurity
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TABLE 6
ESTIMATED MODELS FOR PERCEIVED TENURE INSECURITY
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3)
Household characteristics:
Land endowment (# 102) .059 .065 .035
(.56) (.60) (.36)
No. males of ages:
20–34 .001 .001 .006
(.09) (.05) (.57)
35–49 .021 .021 .025
(1.16) (1.13) (1.49)
50–64 .017 .016 .030
(.69) (.63) (1.33)
65 or older .068** .066** .055*
(2.71) (2.61) (2.42)
No. females of ages:
20–34 .015 .016 .009
(1.44) (1.50) (.93)
35–49 .011 .010 .031
(.62) (.53) (1.92)
50–64 .027 .027 .026
(1.05) (1.06) (1.10)
65 or older .040 .038 .032
(1.57) (1.50) (1.38)
Proportion of adults with more than 9 years
of schooling .001 .003 .007
(.03) (.12) (.26)
Value of agricultural production assets (1,000
RMB) .012 .011 .007
(.84) (.79) (.56)
Household experience of land reallocations .046 .009
(1.95) (.33)
Village characteristics:
Proportion of households experienced reallo-
cation .097**
(2.59)
Average male off-farm wage rate in the vil-
lage (1,000 RMB) .150** .143**
(3.69) (3.53)
Village average of land endowment per adult .009 .008
(1.30) (1.13)
Standard deviation of land endowment per
adult .003 .004
(.59) (.90)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes No
Village fixed effects No No Yes
R2 .18 .15 .01
Note. The dependent variable is the dummy variable that is equal to one if land reallocation is expected
to take place in the next 30 years and zero otherwise. Np number of observationsp 1,017. Numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics.
 Statistically significant at the 10% level.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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perception is shown in table 6.17 The household characteristics have generally
no significant effects on perceived tenure insecurity. An exception is the neg-
ative effect of the number of aged males, which is difficult to explain and
reconcile with the positive effect of aged females. Another exception is that
land reallocation experience at the household level has a negative and significant
effect, as shown in column 2. This effect, however, is completely insignificant
when village-level fixed effects are imposed, as shown in column 3. By contrast,
the village-level experience of land reallocations has a significant effect, which
is consistent with the conjecture discussed above: households’ perception of
tenure insecurity depends on their perception of the village leaders’ attitude
toward the national policy. The positive effect of the village-level experience
of land reallocations on renting out shown in table 5, together with the negative
effect of the experience on the tenure insecurity perception shown in table 6,
presents suggestive evidence for the negative impacts of the insecurity per-
ception on land rental transactions (i.e., hypothesis 1), even though we cannot
test the hypothesis directly because of the lack of a valid instrument variable.
According to table 6, the average off-farm wage rate in the village has a
negative and highly significant effect on the perception of tenure insecurity.
In view of this result, the reason why renting in and renting out are more
active in villages with higher off-farm wage rates, as shown in tables 4 and
5, seems attributable to tenure security in such villages. Then, a question
arises as to why tenure insecurity perception is associated with the average off-
farm wage rate in the village. In the context of our model, it is easy to show
that tenure insecurity affects a greater number of households adversely if off-
farm wage rates are higher. In villages with higher off-farm wage rates, there-
fore, the local government may be more willing to decrease land tenure in-
security if it cares about the popularity of its policy. To the extent that
households take such a political economy effect into account, their tenure
insecurity perceptions may be associated with the village’s average off-farm
wage rate.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Considering that neither farm labor nor land sales markets are expected to
function effectively in China (as in many developing countries), the land rental
market is likely to be the only practical means for achieving an efficient land
allocation across households. When functioning, land rental markets provide
benefits for both the farmers who want to dispose of their land to move to
nonfarm sectors and those who wish to expand their farm size. Thus, the
17 The use of the Probit model specification does not change the estimation results qualitatively.
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development of well-functioning land rental markets is critically important
for facilitating the structural transformation of the economy from an agricul-
tural-based economy to an industrialized one.
In this article, we proposed a theoretical model of land rental transactions.
Our basic hypothesis is that one of the major sources of land rental market
failure in China is the risk of expropriation of land when land is rented out.
Such risk not only impedes the household’s farm size adjustment toward an
optimal size in the absence of such risk but also discourages households from
participating in land rental markets in the first place. The predictions of our
model are empirically tested by using household survey data from China. Our
estimated results suggest that the unclear land allocation policies of local
governments increase the expected risk of land expropriation if land is rented
out. In addition, higher off-farm wage rates are found to activate (or at least
are correlated with) land rental markets; this is most likely because an increase
in off-farm employment opportunities leads to enhanced gains from land rental
transactions.
In order to remove the impediments for tenure transactions in China, further
strengthening of individual land rights (as well as their protection and en-
forcement) by local/regional governments is necessary. Under the current ad-
ministrative land reallocation system, individual land use rights can be taken
away, which appears to be thwarting incentives for farmers, including relatively
unproductive part-time farmers who cultivate tiny plots of land, to rent out
their land. Hence, according to our results, granting and protecting individual
land rights on farmland is one of the major remaining institutional reforms
that must be implemented in China in order to sustain China’s rapid economic
transformation.
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